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Over the last 30 years there has been an impressive amount of empirical work on the 
defence-growth  nexus,  using  different  methodologies,  models  and  econometric 
techniques and focusing on individual case studies, cross-country studies or panel data 
studies.  Despite the number and the variety of studies, the evidence on the defence-
growth relationship is still far from conclusive.   Rather surprisingly, very limited 
work has been published in the relevant literature for the European Union despite the 
continuous discussions for a Common European Defence Policy that would require an 
assessment of the economic effects of defence in this region.  To fill in the gap in the 
literature, this paper employs an augmented Solow-Swan model and estimates it both 
with panel and time series methods to provide empirical evidence on the economic 
effects  of  defence  spending  in  the  EU15  over  the  period  1961-2007.    Overall, 
evidence derived from both panel and time series methods is consistent and suggests 
that military burden does not promote economic growth in this region.   
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The  relationship  between  defence  spending  and  economic  growth  has  been 
extensively investigated since the seminal study of Benoit (1973, 1978) that suggested 
a positive relationship between the two variables.  The simplistic approach and the 
various problems associated with this study triggered many researchers to re-examine 
the  same  relationship  using  more  sophisticated  methods,  different  theoretical 
underpinnings, longer time series or larger cross sections.  Despite all this, and despite 
the huge amount of empirical work since the Benoit study, there is still no consensus 
on the impact of military spending on growth.  Of course, there is a wide variety of 
possible  reasons  that  may  lead  to  different  results  (ie.  different  theoretical 
underpinnings,  models  and  specifications,  different  estimation  methods,  different 
countries, different time periods examined etc) (Dunne and Uye, 2009). This lack of 
consensus  combined  with  continuous  developments  in  econometrics  has  led 
researchers  in  the  area  to  continue  with  attempts  to  identify/establish  a  more 
stable/robust relationship.  
 
The purpose of this paper is four-fold.  First, it aims to provide empirical evidence on 
the defence-growth relationship for the EU15, a region that has not attracted much 
research  interest  despite  its  importance  in  the  global  economic  environment  and 
discussions over the creation of a Common European Defence Area.  Secondly, the 
paper follows Dunne et al. (2005) in employing a growth model that has only recently 
entered the relevant literature; third, it provides both panel and time series estimates 
for the fifteen countries in order to compare between them, and finally, it uses longer 
data series than many previous studies. 
 
The next section provides an overview of the economic development and military 
expenditure pattern in the EU15, with section three reviewing the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature. Section four then, discusses the methods used, specifies the 
model employed and gives the empirical findings. Finally, the last section summarises 




MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EU 
 
As a group, the EU15 has shown an interesting pattern of economic development. As 
Table 1 shows, it enjoyed high growth rates during the 1960s with the average rate 
5.48%. This continued until 1974-5 when the world energy crisis and the recession 
put  most  of  the  countries  into  negative  growth.    The  relatively  poor  economic 
performance continued into the 1980s, before improving slightly in the 1990s, with an 
average growth rate of 3%.  Within this pattern there were some variations as the 
recession  also  coincided  with  the  collapse  of  the  dictatorships  in  three  countries, 
namely Greece, Spain and Portugal and in the case of Greece, 1974 was the year of 
the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus.  The most noticeable improvements in GDP 
growth  during  the  1990s  occurred  in  Ireland  and  Luxembourg  (with  an  average 3 
 
growth rate in the 1990s of 7.84% and 6.22% respectively).  The average growth rate 
of GDP for the 15 EU countries over the years 2001-2007 saw a decline with only 
four  countries  (Finland,  Greece,  Spain  and  Sweden)  experiencing  higher  rates  of 
growth compared with the previous decade.    
 
Table 1. GDP growth for the EU Countries (%) 






Austria  4.96  3.83  2.39  2.47  1.53  3.20 
Belgium  5.19  3.56  1.92  2.17  1.47  3.02 
Denmark   4.76  2.38  2.03  2.51  1.41  2.76 
Finland  5.11  3.71  3.21  2.25  2.32  3.43 
France  5.93  3.49  2.40  2.00  1.53  3.24 
Germany  4.73  2.86  2.35  2.07  0.75  2.75 
Greece  9.31  5.17  0.76  2.45  4.63  4.44 
Ireland  4.43  5.02  3.78  7.84  5.47  5.29 
Italy  6.06  3.82  2.29  1.63  0.65  3.14 
Luxembourg   3.78  2.87  4.87  6.22  3.38  4.32 
Portugal  7.00  5.22  3.38  3.03  0.63  4.21 
Spain  7.91  3.77  3.14  2.84  3.24  4.28 
Sweden  4.65  1.98  2.02  1.92  2.24  2.60 
The Netherlands  5.39  3.10  2.28  3.19  0.96  3.21 
UK  3.02  2.09  2.80  2.51  2.38  2.58 




The variation in growth among the 15 countries is also apparent in the figures for 
GDP per capita, as the figures in Table 2 show. However, the countries at the top end 
with  the  highest  average  GDP  per  capita  throughout  the  period  -  Luxemburg, 
Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria - remained there as did 
countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain at the bottom end. 
                             4 
 
 
Table 2. GDP per capita for the EU Countries (in 1998 US$) 
 






Austria  10194  15605  19681  24365  28120  18646 
Belgium  10691  15993  19356  23463  26915  18436 
Denmark   12985  16999  20601  24476  27884  19779 
Finland  8809  13257  17667  20135  25227  16107 
France  11032  16053  19388  22446  25284  18125 
Germany  13757  18847  23056  23201  24886  20290 
Greece  6185  11755  12914  14327  18149  12057 
Ireland  5903  8668  11301  19182  31268  13486 
Italy  9625  14187  18297  22057  24595  16992 
Luxembourg   14674  19526  25222  40900  54356  28333 
Portugal  4727  8310  10469  14545  16904  10334 
Spain  7695  12071  14022  18256  22665  14084 
Sweden  12903  16774  19788  22081  26542  18848 
The Netherlands  12389  17361  19743  24814  28795  19712 
UK  11463  14386  17466  21636  26283  17354 




Military burden over the period also varied across countries, as shown in Table 3. 
Some  differences  reflect  security  issues,  but  more  are  likely  to  reflect  internal 
pressures resulting from the existence of military industries. Among the big defence 
spenders, the UK and France are the only countries of the European NATO with the 
status of nuclear powers and with Germany, they all have developed defence industry.  
Other countries with a relatively developed defence industry are Spain, Sweden, Italy, 
Austria and the Netherlands. Portugal had a high military burden for the years prior to 
1974 and after that it dramatically decreased, with the end of the dictatorship and 
most importantly with the end of the Colonial  Empire.  However, the  Portuguese 
defence  industry  (like  the  Greek  defence  industry)  is  small,  inefficient  and 
underdeveloped.   For Greece, the end of the dictatorship coincided with the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974 that marked a huge increase in military burden for Greece 
(reaching an average of 6.5% of GDP during the fifteen years following the conflict), 
which even after the end of the Cold War it remained high in comparison to other EU 
countries because of the perceived threat from Turkey (see Nikolaidou, 2008 for more 
details).   5 
 
Table 3. Defence Spending as share of GDP (%) 
  1961-70  1971-80  1981-90  1991-2000  2001-2005  1961-2007 
Austria  1.22  1.15  1.17  0.91  0.80  1.08 
Belgium  3.20  3.05  2.95  1.62  1.30  2.55 
Denmark   2.73  2.30  2.22  1.74  1.54  2.17 
Finland  1.73  1.56  1.85  1.61  1.20  1.63 
France  5.15  3.87  3.90  3.05  2.56  3.83 
Germany  4.18  3.42  3.14  1.73  1.44  2.93 
Greece  4.14  5.83  6.11  4.54  4.24  5.05 
Ireland  1.32  1.52  1.47  0.99  0.72  1.26 
Italy  3.11  2.52  2.25  1.99  2.04  2.42 
Luxembourg  1.18  0.92  1.04  0.80  0.86  0.97 
Portugal  6.76  5.09  3.13  2.42  2.18  4.11 
Spain  1.94  2.03  2.66  1.48  1.14  1.93 
Sweden  3.93  3.29  2.62  2.16  1.74  2.86 
The Netherlands  4.00  3.24  2.99  1.97  1.64  2.89 
UK  5.74  4.85  4.77  3.09  2.64  4.39 
EU15 (average)  3.36  2.98  2.82  2.01  1.74  2.67 
NATO Europe  3.86  3.48  3.26  2.39  2.1  3.1 
US  8.61  6.15  6.35  3.79  3.66  3.7 
NATO  5.22  3.85  3.89  2.56  2.30  3.7 
Source: SIPRI (various Yearbooks) 
 
 
Within the EU15 countries there are clearly some interesting variations in military 
burden and economic performance. There are countries that are economically weak 
and spend a lot on defence (Greece, Portugal), countries that are economically weak 
with a very low defence burden (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Finland) but also rich countries 
that are high defence spenders (France, UK, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) 
and rich countries that are low defence spenders (Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria and 
Belgium).  Estimating  the  rank  correlation  coefficient  (Spearman  correlation)  for 
military burden and growth gave the value -0.27 (see details in the Appendix for the 
calculation  of  the  Spearman  correlation).    This  suggests  that  there  is  a  negative 
association  between  growth  and  military  burden,  so,  countries  with  high  military 
burden have low growth.  This variation suggests that the search for some general 
finding for the group will need to deal with a degree of heterogeneity. It is certainly 
unlikely that a simple pooling of the data will be adequate. 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Defence spending constitutes a significant share of global resources but despite its 
significant size, its economic impact has only recently been an issue of analysis in 
economic  theory.    The  theoretical  analysis  of  military  expenditure  becomes  very 
difficult  as  it  is  not  a  purely  economic  issue  but  rather  a  mixture  of  economic, 
political, strategic, psychological, cultural and even moral aspects.  Although most 6 
 
economic  theory  doesn’t  have  an  explicit  role  for  military  spending  as  a  separate 
economic  activity,  there  are  four  basic  theoretical  approaches  (the  Keynesian,  the 
Neoclassical,  the  Liberal  and  the  Marxist)  that  explain  military  expenditure  from 
different points of view
1. 
 
In the Keynesian framework, the state appears as proactive and interventionist, using 
military  expenditure  to  increase  output  through  multiplier  effects  when  aggregate 
demand is ineffective (Dunne, 1996).  Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) also mention 
that  if  aggregate  demand  is  low  relative  to  potential  supply,  increases  in  military 
expenditure can lead to increased capacity utilisation, increased profits and hence, 
increased investment and economic growth.  In the empirical literature, Keynesian 
demand-side  models  are  widely  used  to  explain  the  relationship  between  defence 
spending  and  economic  growth.  Empirical  work  within  this  demand-concentrated 
framework  tends  to  find  a  negative  relationship  between  military  expenditure  and 
economic growth (through the crowding out of savings or investment).  The basic 
disadvantage  of  this  theory  is  that  it  focuses  on  demand-side  issues  and  fails  to 
consider supply-side issues (technology spin-offs and externalities).  Smith and Smith 
(1980) were the first to include explicit production functions in order to overcome this 
problem of concentrating on the demand side only.  A linked liberal or institutional 
approach  regards  the  Military  Industrial  Complex  (MIC)  as  the  central  point  in 
explaining military expenditure.  The MIC is a powerful interest group that benefits 
from defence spending and thus, has an incentive to exaggerate international conflicts 
and to hinder attempts to settle disputes by non-military means (Dunne, 1990).   
 
Marxists consider militarism and military expenditure as a social phenomenon with a 
historical aspect and they focus on the socio-political and strategic aspects of military 
expenditure  and  not  so  much  on  the  economic  ones.    They  argue  that  defence 
spending stimulates economic growth by preventing crises or by acting as an informal 
industrial policy (Dunne, 1990).  Within this school of thought there is one theoretical 
perspective  that  has  a  fundamental  role  for  military  expenditure.  The 
underconsumptionist approach developed by Baran and Sweezy (1966), claims that as 
a capitalist economy grows richer, the available surplus grows beyond that absolutely 
necessary  for  consumption  and  investment.    So,  within  the  underconsumptionist 
framework, military expenditure will be beneficial to growth when the economy is in 
disequilibrium.   
 
In contrast, Neoclassicals see defence spending as a pure public good supplied by the 
state, which recognises some well-defined national interest that it seeks to protect.  So 
the state can appear as  a rational actor that tries to maximise national interest by 
balancing  opportunity  costs  and  security  benefits  of  military  expenditure.    In  the 
empirical  work,  supply-side  models  of  the  defence-growth  relationship  within  the 
neoclassical  framework,  derive  from  the  aggregate  production  function.  A  widely 
used supply-side model is the one developed by Feder (1982) and further elaborated 
by Ram (1986) and Biswas and Ram (1986) who considered military expenditure as 
an exogenous variable and estimated its dynamic real effects on output.  However, a 
recent  critique  by  Dunne  et  al.  (2005)  makes  the  Feder-type  model  look  very 
problematic both in terms of theoretical underpinnings and in terms of econometric 
                                                           
1 See also, Smith (1977), Georgiou (1983), and Dunne (1990, 1996). 7 
 
issues.    Other  growth  models  that  have  been  applied  in  the  defence  economics 
literature  are  the  Barro  (1990)  model  (applied  by  Aizenman  and  Glick,  2003; 
Mylonidis, 2008; Pieroni, 2009), the augmented Solow model (introduced by Mankiw 
et al. (1992) and applied by Knight  et al.(1996)).  Furthermore,  Halicioglu  (2004) 
following Atesoglou (2002) adopted the new macroeconomic model of Romer (2000) 
and Taylor (2000) that replaces the standard IS-LM and AD-AS models and provides 
a more detailed account of fiscal and monetary policies on the national income.     
 
 
Most of the recent studies avoid a reliance on ad-hoc specifications and tend to be 
based  on  well-specified  theoretical  frameworks  -  usually  the  Keynesian  or  the 
Neoclassical frameworks- which allow the development of consistent formal models.   
 
Overall, while the empirical results offer no consensus on the economic effects of 
military spending, the  most common finding is that military burden has either no 
significant effect, or a negative effect on economic growth for developing countries
2. 
To our knowledge, there are only three studies that focus on the EU15, to estimate the 
defence-growth relationship, namely, Kollias et al. (2007), Kollias et al. (2004) and 
Mylonidis (2008).  The first study investigates the causal relationship between growth 
and milex over the period 1961-2000 by panel data methods and finds evidence of a 
positive bi-directional causality in the long-run and a positive effect from milex to 
growth  in  the  short-run.    Given  these  results,  the  authors  argue  that  increases  in 
defence may promote growth in this region.  However, this study has been criticised 
by Hatzinikolaou (2007) for the econometric analysis employed.  Furthermore, the 
empirical findings of Kollias et al. (2007) study are in contrast to an earlier causality 
study by Kollias et al. (2004) for the EU15 over the same period of time where the 
authors  provide  country  by  country  analysis  and  they  find  that  growth  positively 
affects milex.  It does seem strange that the results of these studies differ although the 
analysis in both studies is for the same set of countries and over the same period; the 
only difference is the estimation methods (time series approach for the 2004 study 
while panel data approach for the 2007 study).  Finally, the third study by Mylonidis 
(2008)  that  focuses  on  the  EU14
3  employs  a  Barro-type  model  to  investigate  the 
economic effects of milex using cross-section and panel data methods.  The empirical 
evidence from this study points to a strong negative effect of milex on growth.  It 
becomes obvious then, that among the three studies for the EU15 there is absolutely 
no  common  outcome.    The  present  study  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  by 
providing empirical evidence for the EU15 with more recent data and using the model 
and estimation methods outlined below.  
 
                                                           
2 Chan (1985) surveying the relevant literature could not find any consistency in the empirical findings 
while Ram (1995) reviewing 29 studies found little evidence of a positive effect of defence on growth 
but it was also difficult to say that the evidence supported a negative effect.  On the other hand, Dunne 
(1996) reviewing 54 studies concluded that military spending had at best no effect on growth and was 
likely to have a negative effect while Smith (2000) suggests that most likely there is a small negative 
effect in the long run.  Furthermore, Dunne and Uye (2009) surveying 103 studies on the defence-
growth  relationship  found  20%  with  positive  effects,  37%  with  negative  and  43%  with  unclear 
findings.  They also suggest that some of the positive findings should be discounted.   
3 Mylonidis (2008) excludes Luxembourg from the sample because of the unavailability of education 
data for this country. 8 
 
 
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
As  mentioned,  the  various  problems  associated  with  the  Feder-Ram  model  have 
encouraged researchers to develop other more sound models in order to assess the 
impact of military expenditure on growth.  Specifically, Dunne et al. (2005) following 
the Knight et al  (1996) model proposed an augmented Solow  growth  model with 







Which leads to an estimable model of the form: 
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Where: 
y = yp = GDP per capita 
x1= iy = gross investment/GDP,  
x2 = my = military expenditure/GDP,  
x4 = ngd = n+g+d = labour force growth rate + 0.05, 
x5 = tr = trend 
 
 
In this model the key assumption is that my (military expenditure as a share of GDP) 
affects factor productivity via level effects on the efficiency parameter which controls 
labour-augmenting technical change. Furthermore, g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-
neutral technical progress. The simplest specification for the above equation would be 
to  assume  homogeneity  across  countries  and  over  time.    However,  this  would 
presuppose that all EU15 countries have the same set of coefficients and so, the same 
transmission  mechanism  from  defence  to  growth.  Given  the  differences  across 
countries (see section two of this paper) in levels of economic development, size of 
defence burden and extent of military industry it would seem sensible to allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries, using fixed or random effects estimation 
methods.  
 
Time fixed effects can also be allowed for separately or together in a two way fixed 
effect model. The group fixed effect is estimated consistently for large T, the time 
fixed effect for large N. Dynamic fixed effect estimates of the slopes in models that 
contain a lagged dependent variable are consistent for large T, but not for large N, 
when T fixed.  T is large here, so the bias may be small and when computing the long 
run coefficients the biases are likely to offset each other. If the parameters differ over 
groups there is a further heterogeneity bias, which can be dealt with by using the 
mean group estimator, which entails estimating each equation individually and taking 
an average of the individual estimates (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). When N is small, as 
in this case, the mean group estimator may be sensitive to outliers.  
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Estimating a log linear reparameterised general first order dynamic model form of the 
above model, with the dependent variable the change in the log of GDP per capita, 
∆lyp, and using fixed and random effects for the EU15, gives the results in Table 4. 
Given the different definitions of the labour force across countries, labour force is 
proxied by population to construct the augmented labour force growth rate (ngd). The 
variable  liy  is  the  share  of  gross  investment  in  GDP,  my  is  the  share  of  defence 
spending in GDP and (-1) implies a one period lag. For one way fixed effects and 
random effects, technology is proxied by the trend (tr). 
 
Table 4. Panel estimates  (1961-2007) 
 
  One way  Two way 
  Fixed    Random    Fixed    Random   
Variable  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  T  Coefficient  T 
C  -0.260  -6.1  -0.210  -5.5  -0.330  -6.9  -0.219  -5.6 
lyp(-1)  -0.008  -1.0  -0.016  -4.6  0.010  0.9  -0.019  -6.5 
∆liy  0.163  11.5  0.165  11.8  0.121  6.4   0.144  10.1 
liy(-1)  0.016  1.8  0.018  2.9  0.013  1.3  0.021  3.3 
∆lmy  -0.066  -5.8  -0.064  -5.7  -0.032  -2.4  -0.046  -4.2 
lmy(-1)  -0.011  -2.2  -0.008  -4.6  0.002  0.3  -0.006  -3.2 
ngd  -0.097  -11.1  -0.083  -10.1  -0.099  -12.2  -0.082  -10.1 
tr  -0.001  -2.2  -0.0003  -3.2  ..  ..  ..  .. 
 
Rsq  0.400    0.364    0.575    0.291   
SER   0.022    0.022    0.019    0.020   
DW  1.517    1.451    1.544    1.4116   
 
 
We are mainly interested in the cross section fixed effects as we try to model the 
dynamics, but we also estimate a two way fixed effects model for comparison. Not 
surprisingly, the two way fixed effects method gives somewhat different results from 
the others for a dynamic specification. In this case the lagged dependent variable has a 
positive coefficient, making it explosive and causing all of the long run coefficients to 
change  sign.  This  means  these  results  should  probably  be  ignored.    There  are 
relatively consistent results for the one way fixed and random effects and the two way 
random effects –most coefficients are significant and have the same signs and similar 
magnitudes. The log of the investment share has a positive effect on growth in both 
the  difference  and  level  forms  while  the  log  of  military  burden  has  a  consistent 
negative effect for both difference and level. The reported R-squared is based on the 
difference between the residual sums of squares from the estimated model, that is 10 
 
from a single constant-only specification, not from a fixed-effects-only specification. 
As a result, the interpretation of these statistics is that they describe the explanatory 
power of the entire specification, including the estimated fixed effects. The reported 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  is  formed  simply  by  computing  the  first-order  residual 
correlation on the stacked set of residuals. Testing the fixed effects strongly rejects the 
null  that  the  cross  section  fixed  effects  are  redundant.  Calculating  the  long  run 
coefficients gave the results in Table 5:  
 
Table 5. Estimated long-run coefficients (1961-2007) 
  One way  Two way 
  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random 
c  -32.5    -13.1    33.0    -11.5   
liy  2.0    1.1    -1.3    1.1   
lmy  -1.4    -0.5    -0.2    -0.3   
lngd  -12.1    -5.2    9.9    -4.3   
tr  -0.1    0.02    ..    ..   
 
Again apart from the two way fixed effects, these are consistent with expectations 
across the specifications, with a clear negative impact of military burden in the long 
run, though the lagged dependent variable in the fixed effects was insignificant.  The 
analysis in the second section suggested that cross country differences would exist 
and the estimates of the fixed effects did indeed show clear evidence of some serious 
heterogeneity, with Greece (positive) and Austria (negative) having particularly large 
coefficients. This suggests some further investigation might be warranted. 
  
Given the available time series 1961-2007 is relatively long, it is possible to estimate 
the model for each country. The long run coefficients, derived from the short run 
coefficients estimates for each of the 15 countries are reported in Table 6. To save 
space, the individual results are not reported here but they  are  available from the 
authors on request. As Table 6 shows, there is indeed heterogeneity in the results, 
though for most of the  countries, there is a significant negative effect  of military 
burden on growth.  Specifically, military burden has a negative sign for Denmark, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
the  UK.    The  sign  is  positive  only  for  five  out  of  the  fifteen  countries  (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Italy).  There are issues with the significance of the 
individual  coefficients,  however,  with  only  France  and  Spain  having  significant 
negative long run coefficients in the sense of both the lagged output per capita and 
military burden having significant negative coefficients (at 5% significance level).  
All coefficients on the change in military burden are negative and four significant. 
Regarding the labour force variable (proxied by population) the estimates are negative 
and significant for all countries apart from Finland and Luxembourg.  The investment 







Table 6. Estimated long-run coefficients (1961-2007) 
  c  liy  lmy  lngd  Tr 
Austria  -3.06  0.08  0.004  -1.18  0.02 
Belgium  -3.65  0.47  0.005  -1.72  0.01 
Denmark  0.87  0.03  -0.21  -0.66  0.01 
Finland  0.62  3.29  0.09  4  0.09 
France  0.78  -0.51  -0.85  -1.87  -0.01 
Germany  15.39  2.1  0.16  -4.29  -0.001 
Greece  -5.99  1.5  -0.11  -1.21  0.03 
Ireland  -5.37  0.19  -0.44  -2.46  0.05 
Italy  0.51  -0.86  0.65  -1.65  0.002 
Luxembourg  2.42  0.23  -0.32  0.19  0.03 
The Netherlands  -11.2  1.71  -0.35  -3.29  0.004 
Portugal  -2.98  0.25  -0.1  -1.65  0.01 
Spain  -1.29  0.41  -0.29  -0.98  0.01 
Sweden  0.54  0.15  -0.19  -0.67  0.01 




Using these individual country results, Table 7 reports the estimates for mean group 
estimator, the mean coefficient and the estimated standard error. All variables have 
the expected signs with the military burden coefficient having the value of -0.14. This 
is negative but is smaller in absolute value than both the random and fixed effect 
estimates in Table 5 and insignificant. This may result from the mean group estimator 
being sensitive to outliers, particularly when N is relatively small as in this study. For 
fixed effects the construction of the estimator means that as long as an outlier can be 
considered as counting for a small proportion of the variance it will have little effect, 
making fixed effects more robust to outliers.  
 
 
Table 7. Summary of individual country LR estimates for the EU15 
  c  liy  lmy  lngd  Tr 
mean  -0.70  0.61  -0.14  -1.17  0.02 




As  well  as  being  sensitive  to  outliers,  the  mean  group  approach  uses  the  same 
specification for each country, which can fail to allow for some important country-
specific events that were observed to be important for the individual countries. Such 
heterogeneity will also not be fully picked up in simple fixed effects models. Re-
estimating the model for each country with dummies introduced country to account 12 
 
for specific recessions and crises, gave the results in Table 8
4. These results showed 
some improvement over those in Table 6, with only two countries, Italy and Portugal, 
having positive long run coefficient estimates for the military burden variable. France, 
Germany and Spain have significant negative long run coefficients in the sense of 
both  the  lagged  output  per  capita  and  military  burden  having  significant  negative 
coefficients and five countries have significant coefficients on the changes in military 
burden variable.The means of the coefficients in Table 9 show a value of -0.38 for 
military burden, which is larger in absolute terms than that for the model without 
dummies, but remains insignificant.   
 
 
Table 8. Estimated long-run coefficients with dummies (1961-2007) 
  c  Liy  lmy  ngd  tr  D 
Austria  -21.33  5.27  -0.40  -3.27  -0.02  -1.87 
Belgium  -22.50  2.25  -2.00  -9.25  -0.12  -4.37 
Denmark  0.83  -0.04  -0.37  -0.78  0.01  -0.09 
Finland  2.23  -2.73  -0.18  -3.91  -0.09  -1.86 
France  3.33  -0.68  -1.18  -1.40  -0.02  -0.33 
Germany  0.04  0.52  -0.51  -0.63  0.01  -0.59 
Greece  -8.39  1.96  -0.16  -1.58  0.02  -0.89 
Ireland  -7.25  0.14  -0.29  -3.29  0.07  -1.14 
Italy  -0.79  -1.17   1.33  -2.62  -0.21  -2.17 
Luxembourg   2.56  0.23  -0.42  0.19  0.03  -0.59 
The Netherlands  -12.59  1.76  -0.43  -3.83  -0.003  -0.40 
Portugal  -4.37  0.43   0.32  -1.66  0.02  -1.13 
Spain  -1.60  0.37  -0.69  -1.66  -0.14  -0.57 
Sweden   1.01  0.19  -0.08  -0.39  0.02  -0.17 
UK   1.40  -0.02  -0.60  -0.45  0.19  -0.21 
 
Table 9. Summary of individual country LR estimates for the EU15 with 
dummies 
  c  Liy  lmy  lngd  tr  D 
mean  -4.49  0.56  -0.38  -2.30  -0.016  -1.09 
sd  8.40  1.79  0.71  2.33  0.10  1.12 
 
Overall, these results do provide a predominance of negative coefficients for the short 
and long run effects of military spending on growth, but many of these estimates are 
insignificant.  Certainly,  while  there  is  heterogeneity  across  countries,  there  is  no 
                                                           
4 Dummies were introduced to capture major economic crises.  Specifically, a dummy for the year 
1975 was introduced for Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal; a dummy 
for the year 1992 for France, a dummy for the year 1993 for Austria, for 1991 for Finland, 1974 for 
Greece and the UK, 1983 for Ireland, 1991 to 1993 for Sweden, 1975 to 1981 for Spain while a dummy 
for the period after 1992 was introduced in the case of Germany to account for the reunification.  13 
 
evidence to suggest that military expenditure might have a positive effect on growth 
in the EU 15. These results are not inconsistent with Mylonidis (2008), which found 
negative effects of military spending using a Barro-style growth model, but are in 
contrast to two Granger causality studies by Kollias et al. (2004; 2007), for the same 
region. Dunne and Smith (2010) do warn against surmising the sign of a relationship 
when using the Granger causality methods without an identified structural model and 
the evidence of the importance of the non-military variables in the growth models 




This paper makes a contribution to the growing literature on the economic effects of 
military spending, by using a long data set on a group of related countries, the EU15, 
that  have  been  little  studied.  The  data  set  is  both  long  and  relatively  up  to  date 
capturing the impact of post Cold War changes in the security environment and taking 
account  of  the  Dunne  et  al.  (2005)  critique,  the  paper  employed  the  augmented 
Solow-Swan model to provide a dynamic estimable growth model. The initial analysis 
of the experience of the countries over the period suggested a negative association 
between military spending and growth, but also identified unobserved heterogeneity. 
This was dealt with using fixed and random effects models on a general dynamic 
model. Some large fixed effects suggested it might be worthwhile investigating the 
degree of heterogeneity further. As there was  adequate time series, a  mean group 
estimator was used, which gave results that were in line with the panel estimates. 
There were insignificant coefficients for a number of countries that suggest caution in 
interpreting the results too strongly, but when dummy variables were introduced into 
the equations to deal with specific economic shocks in individual countries, while the 
individual country results were improved the mean coefficients were still close to the 
panel data estimates. 
 
Overall,  this  extensive  test  of  different  panel  data  specifications,  leads  to  the 
conclusion that military burden, does not have a positive impact on the economies of 
the  EU15  and  that  it  either  has  a  negative  effect  or  no  effect  at  all.  This  is  not 
inconsistent with the findings of Mylonidis (2008), but is weaker. It is inconsistent 
with the positive effects surmised in the Granger causality tests of Kollias et al. (2004; 
2007), but the Dunne and Smith (2010) warning over the interpretation of such tests 
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TABLE A1 Spearman rank correlation for military burden and growth 
     














































































































Greece  15  5.05  14  4.44  1  1 
             
            ∑712 
Spearman Correlation (ρ) = 1 – [6∑d
2
i /(n(n
2 -1))] = -0.27 
 
 
 
 